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INTRODUCTION
In a series of Eighth Amendment cases referred to as the Miller trilogy,1 the
Supreme Court significantly limited the extent to which minors may be exposed to
extreme sentences.2 Specifically, in this line of cases the Court abolished capital
punishment for minors and narrowed the instances when minors may be sentenced
to life without parole. Only minors convicted of homicide who are found to be “incorrigible” may now be subject to a death-in-custody sentence. In limiting extreme
sentences for youth in these ways, the Supreme Court relied upon the social and
medical science that demonstrates youth are simultaneously less culpable for their
acts and more amenable to rehabilitation than adults.
While the Miller trilogy has set in motion many significant juvenile justice
reforms, youth in America are still exposed to extreme sentences—sentences that
are disproportionate given the nature of the juvenile brain.3 Two mechanisms
* Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America. © 2021, Cara H. Drinan.
1. This term refers to Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), and
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
2. See infra Part I.
3. In the wake of the Miller trilogy, it is also true that far too many minors continue to be exposed to life or
virtual life sentences. See generally Cara H. Drinan, The Future of Juvenile Life-Without-Parole Sentences, in
THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND ITS FUTURE IN A NEW AGE OF PUNISHMENT (Meghan J. Ryan & William W.
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operate to maintain this status quo.4 First, automatic transfer provisions allow children to be charged, tried, and convicted in criminal court as if they were adults.
This legal fiction flies in the face of the science on which the Miller trilogy was
predicated. Second, once in adult court, youth are subject to mandatory sentencing
schemes that were drafted with adults in mind. Again, this automatic sentencing
without regard for the mitigating qualities of youth ignores the logic of the Miller
trilogy. Indeed, some courts have recognized the disconnect between the Supreme
Court’s declaration that “kids are different”5 for sentencing purposes and the
ongoing use of automatic transfer provisions and mandatory sentencing schemes
for youth.6 For the most part, though, courts view correction of these laws as purely
a legislative prerogative. In this Article, I argue that, in fact, there is a clear path
for courts to find both automatic transfer laws and mandatory minimums as applied
to youth unlawful after Miller.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides a brief overview of the Miller
trilogy and the reforms that this line of cases has set in motion over the last ten years.
Part II then discusses how the combination of automatic transfer provisions and mandatory sentencing schemes operates to expose youth to extreme sentences notwithstanding the Court’s recent case law holding that children are not “miniature adults.”7
In Part III, I make the case that each of these mechanisms—transfer laws and mandatory minimums as applied to youth—are unconstitutional after Miller. Finally, by
way of conclusion, I address two recurring criticisms of this thesis.
I. THE MILLER TRILOGY AND ENSUING REFORMS
In the past, I have written extensively about the Miller trilogy cases, their methodology, and their import.8 Here, I address them briefly only for purposes of context. In 2005, the Supreme Court began to limit the states’ ability to impose on

Berry III eds., 2020) (exploring how the Miller trilogy has impacted juvenile life without parole sentencing but
not completely eliminated life and virtual life sentences for juveniles). In this Article, I am not focused on
juvenile life without parole (“JLWOP”) or its equivalent, but rather the more routine—but no less devastating—
instances when youth are subject to decade(s)-long sentences on a mandatory basis.
4. See infra Part II.
5. See Perry L. Moriearty, Miller v. Alabama and the Retroactivity of Proportionality Rules, 17 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 929, 949 (2015) (stating that, with the Roper decision, “[t]he Court’s modern ‘kids are different’
jurisprudence was born”).
6. See infra Part III.
7. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 274 (2011) (holding that a child’s age is relevant to whether the
child was “in custody” and therefore entitled to Miranda protections).
8. See generally CARA H. DRINAN, THE WAR ON KIDS: HOW AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE LOST ITS WAY 84–
96 (2017) (discussing Miller trilogy and subsequent promising legislative and judicial developments); Cara H.
Drinan, The Miller Revolution, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1787 (2016) [hereinafter Drinan, The Miller Revolution]
(discussing revolutionary changes to juvenile justice policy that are possible post-Miller); Cara H. Drinan,
Misconstruing Graham & Miller, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 785 (2014) (discussing how state actors have failed to
comply with sentencing requirements imposed by the Graham and Miller rulings); Cara H. Drinan, Graham on
the Ground, 87 WASH. L. REV. 51 (2012) (discussing implications of Graham for inmates as well as criminal
justice reform more broadly).
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children the harshest of criminal sentences. The Supreme Court held in Roper v.
Simmons that the Constitution bars the execution of juveniles.9 The Roper Court
examined youth as a group and analyzed whether execution of minors was proportionate given their diminished culpability and greater capacity for rehabilitation.10
At the same time, the Court looked at legislative trends regarding juvenile execution and exercised its own judgment to rule that the practice violated evolving
standards of decency.11 Of particular import to the Roper Court was science that
established children were categorically different from adults.12 This science proved
that juveniles are lacking in maturity and impulse control; that they are more susceptible to negative peer influences than adults; and that their moral character is
still fluid.13 And because of these developmental differences, the Court held that
juveniles are less culpable than adults and that the goals of retribution and deterrence cannot justify the death penalty for minors.14
Five years later, in Graham v. Florida, the Court embraced the same underlying
science when examining the question of whether life without parole is a permissible sentence for a juvenile who commits a non-homicide crime.15 As the Court
explained, the Eighth Amendment bars both “barbaric” punishments and punishments that are disproportionate to the crime committed.16 Further, within the latter
category of proportionality cases, the Court traditionally examined term-of-year
sentences on a case-by-case basis, while in the death penalty context, it considered
categorical restrictions.17 In a significant methodological departure,18 the Court
held that, because Graham’s case challenged “a particular type of sentence” as
applied “to an entire class of offenders who have committed a range of crimes,”
the Court should rely upon its (previously capital) categorical approach.19 Using
this approach, and again relying upon the scientific differences between adolescents and adults,20 the Graham Court held that the Constitution precludes a juvenile life-without-parole (“JLWOP”) sentence for a non-homicide crime.21

9. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005).
10. Id. at 569–74.
11. Id. at 574–75.
12. See id. at 569–70.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 571–72, 575.
15. 560 U.S. 48, 52–53 (2010).
16. Id. at 59.
17. Id. at 59–61.
18. See, e.g., Alison Siegler & Barry Sullivan, “‘Death is Different’ No Longer”: Graham v. Florida and the
Future of Eighth Amendment Challenges to Noncapital Sentences, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 327, 328 (noting that,
previously, the Court had only considered categorical exclusions for death penalty cases).
19. Graham, 560 U.S. at 61–62.
20. Id. at 68 (“[D]evelopments in psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences
between juvenile and adult minds.”).
21. Id. at 74.
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In 2012, in Miller v. Alabama, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth
Amendment bars JLWOP sentences even in most homicide cases.22 Specifically,
JLWOP is not permissible unless the sentencing body takes into account “how
children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.”23 Sentencing bodies must analyze the minor’s
developmental environment,24 and only if it is determined that the minor is “the
rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption,”25 is JLWOP
constitutional.26
Before addressing the work that remains to be done in terms of implementing
the Miller trilogy, it is important to acknowledge the wave of reforms that this line
of cases has set in motion over the last fifteen years. Based on the narrowest reading of these cases, the Court outlawed juvenile execution, banned JLWOP in nonhomicide cases, and significantly limited the instances in which states can impose
JLWOP in homicide cases. In 2011, the year before Miller, only five states banned
JLWOP,27 whereas today twenty-four states and the District of Columbia ban the
sentence.28 Another six states have no one serving a JLWOP sentence.29 At the end
of 2018, almost 400 individuals once sentenced to die in prison as children had
returned to their homes and communities.30 In addition to these successful implementation efforts, the logic and science of the Miller trilogy have generated a host
of arguments regarding enhanced procedural safeguards for youth facing extreme
sentences.31 Finally, there is growing consensus among the electorate in favor of
rehabilitation for justice-involved youth, hopefully foreclosing the misguided

22. 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012).
23. Id. at 480; see also id. at 471–72 (reviewing the Roper and Graham discussions of why children are
scientifically and constitutionally different).
24. See id. at 477–80 (considering the circumstances in Miller’s case, including abuse and neglect).
25. Id. at 479–80 (citation omitted).
26. While not technically part of the Miller trilogy, it is important to note that in Montgomery v. Louisiana,
the Court held that its Miller decision was retroactively applicable. 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016).
27. CAMPAIGN FOR FAIR SENT’G OF YOUTH, RIGHTING WRONGS: THE FIVE-YEAR GROUNDSWELL OF STATE
BANS ON LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR CHILDREN 4 (2016), https://cfsy.org/wp-content/uploads/RightingWrongs-.pdf.
28. States that Ban Life Without Parole, CAMPAIGN FOR FAIR SENT’G OF YOUTH (Jan. 19, 2021), https://www.
fairsentencingofyouth.org/media-resources/states-that-ban-life/.
29. Id.
30. CAMPAIGN FOR FAIR SENT’G OF YOUTH, TIPPING POINT: A MAJORITY OF STATES ABANDON LIFEWITHOUT-PAROLE SENTENCES FOR CHILDREN 6 (2018), https://www.fairsentencingofyouth.org/wp-content/
uploads/Tipping-Point.pdf. But see Eli Hager, “Juvenile Lifers” Were Meant to Get a Second Chance. COVID19 Could Get Them First., MARSHALL PROJECT (June 3, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/
2020/06/03/sentenced-to-life-as-teens-they-fear-getting-coronavirus-before-getting-a-second-chance (discussing
the fact that nearly 1,000 “juvenile lifers” are still awaiting relief to which they are entitled per Miller).
31. See, e.g., David Siegel, What Hath Miller Wrought: Effective Representation of Juveniles in CapitalEquivalent Proceedings, 39 CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 363, 372 (2013) (arguing for heightened standard of
representation for youth facing JLWOP); Sarah French Russell, Review for Release: Juvenile Offenders, State
Parole Practices, and the Eighth Amendment, 89 IND. L.J. 373, 375–76 (2014) (reviewing state parole protocols
and urging youth-specific reforms in light of Miller).
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attitude of “adult time for adult crime.”32 These are all positive developments that
one can trace back to the Supreme Court’s moral leadership in the Miller trilogy.
However, as I discuss in the next two Parts, justice-involved youth in America
are still routinely subject to harsh term-of-year sentences that do not take into
account the mitigating aspects of youth, and courts can correct that.
II. TRANSFER LAWS AND MANDATORY SENTENCING AS THE PERFECT STORM
FOR KIDS
Despite post-Miller reform efforts, youth in America are still subject to excessively harsh criminal sentences. Here, I am focused not on the persistence of
JLWOP, but on the more routine applications of adult criminal statutes to minors
that result in disproportionate sentences.33 The Supreme Court has read the Eighth
Amendment to bar not just sentences that are cruel because they are “barbaric,”
but also sentences that are cruel because they are disproportionate.34 When considering whether a sentence is disproportionate to the crime committed, the Court has
indicated a number of objective criteria that are relevant, including the “culpability
of the offender.”35 Moreover, after the Miller trilogy, the Court has solidified the
fact that children are categorically less culpable than adults based on developmental factors alone.36 Finally, the Court has made clear that its proportionality analysis is not exclusively applicable to a certain kind of sentence, but rather applies to
all punishments.37
Accordingly, even outside the context of JLWOP, courts should be taking into
account the diminished culpability of children. When they fail to do so, courts
impose a disproportionate, and thus unconstitutional sentence, on a minor. In this
Part, I explain that courts are routinely doing just that—imposing disproportionate
sentences on minors—and often are doing so against their own judicial inclinations.
This is because courts seem constrained by two related procedural elements that
subject children to extreme sentences, each of which I discuss in turn below: transfer laws that place children in adult court and mandatory sentencing schemes that
apply once children are in the criminal court’s jurisdiction.

32. See, e.g., PEW CHARITABLE TRS., PUBLIC OPINION ON JUVENILE JUSTICE IN AMERICA (2014), https://www.
pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2015/08/pspp_juvenile_poll_web.pdf (finding that seventy-five percent of voters
agree that treatment, counseling, and supervision are more important for juveniles than time in a corrections
facility).
33. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
34. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983) (“The principle that a punishment should be proportionate to the
crime is deeply rooted and frequently repeated in common-law jurisprudence.”).
35. Id. at 292.
36. See supra Part I.
37. Solem, 463 U.S. at 288–89 (noting Eighth Amendment limitations apply to bail, fines, capital sentences,
and felony prison sentences); id. at 290 (“[A] single day in prison may be unconstitutional in some
circumstances.”).
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A. Transfer Laws
From the end of the nineteenth century, when the United States developed the
juvenile court model, to the mid-twentieth century, children accused of a crime
were dealt with in juvenile court.38 Removal from the juvenile court system was
rare and difficult. But as the nation embraced tough-on-crime sentiments, state and
federal lawmakers introduced “transfer laws,” which enabled a child to be
removed from a juvenile court’s jurisdiction and tried in criminal court as if they
were an adult. These transfer laws took on various forms: some defined by statute
the charges that automatically triggered criminal court jurisdiction; others required
a transfer hearing before a judge; and the most harmful ones granted prosecutors
unfettered discretion to charge kids in adult court when they saw fit.39
As of 2018, every state had some transfer provision that permitted a child to be
tried, convicted, and sentenced in adult criminal court.40 Most states have several
such provisions.41 For example, in Florida, there are four mechanisms by which a
child may be charged in adult criminal court: (1) a statutory provision that excludes
certain minors from juvenile court based on age, the nature of the charges, and
prior convictions; (2) discretionary transfer that permits the prosecutor to request
transfer to adult court for any child age fourteen and older; (3) a provision that
allows prosecutors to directly file a minor’s case in criminal court if the minor is
age fourteen or older and has been charged with statutorily delineated crimes; and
(4) a “Once an Adult, Always an Adult” provision that requires minors previously
convicted in criminal court to thereafter be dealt with in adult court.42 In twentytwo states and the District of Columbia, there is at least one transfer provision that
sets no minimum age requirement for transfer to adult court.43 These kind of laws
are predicated on the legal fiction that, if a child is accused of a certain crime or
has reached a certain stage of adolescence, that child is now an adult in the eyes of
the law.
Transfers laws inflict serious, lasting damage on justice-involved youth.44 To
begin, juvenile court proceedings at least in theory are driven by pursuit of the
child’s best interests. A child adjudicated in juvenile court may be offered rehabilitation or treatment, and, even if confined in a detention facility, they will be among

38. See DRINAN, supra note 8, at 20–22, 52–56 (discussing history, nature, and dangers of juvenile transfer
laws); Drinan, The Miller Revolution, supra note 8, at 1791 (same).
39. See DRINAN, supra note 8, at 21–22.
40. Id. at 21; see also OFF. OF JUV. JUST. & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., PROVISIONS FOR
IMPOSING ADULT SANCTIONS ON JUVENILE OFFENDERS (2018), https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/structure_
process/qa04115.asp?qaDate=2018.
41. OFF. OF JUV. JUST. & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, supra note 40.
42. Florida State Profile, NAT’L. JUV. DEF. CTR., https://njdc.info/practice-policy-resources/state-profiles/
florida/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2021).
43. OFF. OF JUV. JUST. & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., MINIMUM TRANSFER AGE
SPECIFIED IN STATUTE (2018), https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/structure_process/qa04105.asp.
44. See DRINAN, supra note 8, at 52–56.
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other minors and have access to education. The same is not true in criminal court
where the generally applicable criminal code applies, and the court is focused on
issues of deterrence and retribution.45 Moreover, youth who are convicted and sentenced in criminal court may end up incarcerated among adults. In 2019, over
4,500 minors—nearly ten percent of all incarcerated youth—were being held in
adult jails and prisons.46 Not only do youth in adult correctional settings miss out
on age-appropriate education and vocational opportunities, but they are also at serious risk for physical and sexual assault, as well as suicide.47 Finally, studies show
that transfer to adult criminal court actually increases the minor’s likelihood of
future recidivism, perhaps in part because the adult criminal conviction hampers
future life opportunities.48
B. Mandatory Minimums
Historically, judges in America have had the discretion to consider all relevant
variables in a criminal case before imposing a sentence. However, as part of the
war on drugs in the late-twentieth century, Congress and state lawmakers enacted
mandatory sentencing statutes.49 These laws require judges to impose a legislatively pre-determined punishment upon a convicted defendant without regard for
the defendant’s personal attributes or mitigating circumstances of the crime.
As scholars have documented widely, mandatory minimums are tremendously
problematic in general.50 They have shifted power from judges to prosecutors, enabling charge-bargaining and unfair plea deals.51 They have contributed to mass
incarceration by requiring lengthy prison terms in cases where the defendant is not
a threat to public safety.52 And they are unfair in perverse ways. For example, they
simultaneously enable similar treatment of individuals with differing degrees of
culpability and excessive punishment of low-level offenders while sparing more
45. Id. at 53.
46. Wendy Sawyer, Youth Confinement: The Whole Pie 2019, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Dec. 19, 2019),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/youth2019.html.
47. Id. (“Adult prisons and jails are unquestionably the worst places for youth.”).
48. DRINAN, supra note 8, at 54.
49. See FAM. AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS (“FAMM”), FAMM PRIMER ON MANDATORY SENTENCES 1–
2, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/famm/Primer.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2021) (explaining the rise of
mandatory minimums for drug crimes).
50. See generally Erik Luna & Paul G. Cassell, Mandatory Minimalism, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (2010)
(arguing for mandatory minimum reform through the observance of political minimalism); John S. Martin Jr.,
Why Mandatory Minimums Make No Sense, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 311 (2004) (offering a
former U.S. District Court judge’s perspective on why mandatory minimum sentences should be abandoned);
Mary Price, Mill(er)ing Mandatory Minimums: What Federal Lawmakers Should Take from Miller v. Alabama,
78 MO. L. REV. 1147 (2013) (arguing for the reform and replacement of mandatory minimum sentencing with
sentencing policies that embrace proportionality).
51. Luna & Cassell, supra note 50, at 14–15; see also Cynthia Alkon, Hard Bargaining in Plea Bargaining:
When Do Prosecutors Cross the Line?, 17 NEV. L.J. 401, 407 (2017).
52. See Martin, Jr., supra note 50, at 314–16 (providing examples where a drug defendant may receive a
longer sentence than “a racist who attacks a minority with the intent to kill” or “a terrorist who detonates a bomb
in a public place”).
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serious defendants.53 There is emerging consensus that any meaningful criminal
justice reform in the twenty-first century will have to include repealing mandatory
sentencing schemes.
C. The Perfect Storm
The interplay of these two mechanisms—transfer laws and mandatory
minimums—is the perfect storm for justice-involved youth. Transfer laws make it
relatively easy and common for youth to be charged in adult criminal court. Once
in criminal court, kids are subject to mandatory minimums that were drafted with
adults in mind and that many now recognize as unfair even as applied to adults.
Some courts have recognized the inherent unfairness of this outcome in light of
what the Supreme Court has said about juveniles’ diminished culpability and
increased amenability to rehabilitation. Some courts have even invited legislative
action.54
And some states’ lawmakers have pursued legislative measures to address the
science that says kids are different. For example, California lawmakers passed a
law in 2018 to prevent the transfer of any child under the age of sixteen to adult
criminal court.55 This was a measure designed to bolster an earlier ballot initiative
that returned to judges the discretion as to whether such a transfer should happen at
all.56 Similarly, Washington amended its mandatory sentencing provisions to
exempt children tried as adults, noting that the “emerging research on brain development indicates that adolescent brains, and thus adolescent intellectual and emotional capabilities, differ significantly from those of mature adults.”57 In recent
years, a number of states have raised the minimum age for transfer to adult court,
and a few are attempting to extend juvenile court jurisdiction beyond the age of
eighteen.58

53. See FAMM, supra note 49, at 7–8 (discussing how, in a conspiracy prosecution, one is subject to the same
mandatory minimum regardless of the role one played and that mitigation through information sharing is
inherently only available to high-level drug traffickers).
54. See, e.g., People v. Patterson, 25 N.E.3d 526, 553 (Ill. 2014) (“[W]e strongly urge the General Assembly
to review the automatic transfer provision based on the current scientific and sociological evidence indicating a
need for the exercise of judicial discretion in determining the appropriate setting for the proceedings in these
juvenile cases.”).
55. Maureen Washburn, California’s Latest Adult Transfer Law Models Pathways for Reform for Rest of U.S.,
JUV. JUST. INFO. EXCH. (Oct. 3, 2018), https://jjie.org/2018/10/03/californias-latest-adult-transfer-law-modelspathways-for-reform-for-rest-of-u-s/.
56. See M. Randell Scism, Children Are Different: The Need for Reform of Virginia’s Juvenile Transfer Laws,
22 RICH. PUB. INT. L. REV. 445, 460–61 (2019) (discussing California’s Proposition 57, the former ballot
initiative).
57. H.B. 11187, § 1, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2005) (establishing the purpose for WASH. REV. CODE
§ 9.94A.540 (2020)).
58. Scism, supra note 56, at 462–64.
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As I have written elsewhere, state legislative bodies can be a fruitful ground for
aggressive juvenile justice reform.59 That said, they need not be the exclusive
forum.
III. THE CASE FOR STRIKING DOWN TRANSFER LAWS AND MANDATORY SENTENCING
OF MINORS
In this Part, I make the case that at least some transfer laws and mandatory minimums as applied to youth are unconstitutional in light of the Miller trilogy. I
address these mechanisms below in the order in which justice-involved youth encounter them.
A. Transfer Laws
Recall that, while every state has juvenile transfer laws, the laws vary in form.60
For purposes of this Article, I am focused on those forms of transfer that eliminate
judicial discretion, specifically statutory exclusion provisions and direct-file laws.
As the name suggests, a statutory exclusion provision states that a child of a certain
age accused of a certain crime is excluded from juvenile court and shall be within
the jurisdiction of the adult court. Direct-file laws permit the prosecutor to charge
the juvenile defendant in adult criminal court on a discretionary basis.61 Such laws
should be barred in light of Miller.
To begin, it is important to recognize that, historically, courts have been deferential in their review of juvenile transfer laws. In Kent v. United States, the U.S.
Supreme Court addressed the question of whether the District of Columbia’s juvenile transfer provision satisfied the Constitution’s requirement of minimal due process.62 The Court concluded that the relevant statute conferred significant latitude
on juvenile court judges, but such “latitude [wa]s not complete.”63 The Court held
that, as a matter of due process, juveniles like Kent were entitled to (1) a hearing
before the juvenile court waived his case to adult-court jurisdiction, (2) access to
the materials relevant to the court’s transfer decision, and (3) a written articulation
of the reasons for the ultimate transfer decision.64 The Kent decision was friendly
to juveniles in that it rejected the concept of absolute, unfettered judicial waiver to
adult court, but it did not require very much of juvenile courts beyond the creation
of a record. Moreover, the Kent decision did not address alternative transfer mechanisms, such as statutory exclusion and direct-file provisions that became common
in the late-twentieth century.

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

See Drinan, supra note 3, at 264–65.
See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text.
Drinan, The Miller Revolution, supra note 8, at 1793.
383 U.S. 541, 543 (1966).
Id. at 552–53.
Id. at 561–62.
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In subsequent years, advocates challenged juvenile transfer laws on various
grounds with little success. For example, in People v. J.S., the Illinois Supreme
Court considered the constitutionality of a statute that required fifteen- and
sixteen-year-old defendants charged with specific offenses to be tried in adult court.65
The court upheld the statutory exclusion provision, rejecting claims that it violated
the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. The court noted that classification
based on age was not uncommon and was rationally related to the government’s legitimate state interest in prosecuting serious crimes.66 Moreover, the court held that the
statute’s delineation of certain felonies as the basis for transfer to adult court was not
arbitrary and thus did not violate due process. Instead, according to the court, the violent nature of the specified crimes and the frequency of their commission justified
their inclusion (and not others) as a basis for transfer.67
In the five decades since the Kent decision, many courts have come to similar
conclusions when confronted with challenges to juvenile transfer provisions.68 I
suggest, however, that in the wake of the Miller trilogy, courts should reconsider
the constitutional legitimacy of direct-file and statutory-exclusion transfer laws.
First, there is precedent for judicial constraint on juvenile transfer laws on which
courts can build. Second, cases in which courts rejected constitutional challenges
to transfer laws are now anachronistic in light of contemporary juvenile justice
principles. They simply cannot coexist with the Supreme Court’s recent reliance
upon the science of adolescent brain development. And finally, the Eighth
Amendment provides courts an opportunity to reconsider the constitutionality of
these laws. I develop each of these steps in greater detail below.
1. Some Precedent for Successful Challenges to Juvenile Transfer Laws
As discussed above, in the post-Kent years, courts entertained a number of constitutional challenges to juvenile transfer laws, and in most cases, they upheld the
laws. Juveniles transferred to adult court mounted challenges of three kinds: due
process, equal protection, and separation of powers. Often litigants raised all three

65. 469 N.E.2d 1090, 1092 (Ill. 1984).
66. Id. at 1093–94.
67. Id. at 1094–95.
68. See, e.g., Manduley v. Superior Ct., 41 P.3d 3, 27 (Cal. 2002) (upholding prosecutorial discretion to file
cases of minors in adult court against constitutional objections), superseded by statute, Public Safety and
Rehabilitation Act of 2016, Prop. 57, § 4.2 (codified as amended at CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707 (2019));
State v. Cain, 381 So. 2d 1361, 1367 (Fla. 1980) (upholding prosecutor’s right to direct file juvenile cases in adult
court); People v. Thorpe, 641 P.2d 935, 939–40 (Colo. 1982) (upholding direct-file provision against due process
and equal protection challenges); State v. Aalim, 83 N.E.3d 883, 887 (Ohio 2017) (upholding statutory-exclusion
law against constitutional challenge); State v. Perique, 439 So. 2d 1060, 1064–65 (La. 1983) (upholding
statutory-exclusion law against as-applied constitutional challenge); State v. Leach, 425 So. 2d 1232, 1235–37
(La. 1983) (upholding statutory-exclusion law against facial constitutional challenge); Bishop v. State, 462 S.
E.2d 716, 718–19 (Ga. 1995) (upholding prosecutorial discretion in juvenile transfer).

2021]

THE MILLER TRILOGY AND EXTREME JUVENILE SENTENCES

1669

objections. They also routinely failed in these claims. For example, in Bishop v.
State,69 the state’s attorney exercised discretion to keep a fourteen-year-old in
Georgia’s adult court system. The juvenile defendant argued that the prosecution’s
power to select the forum for the case was, in fact, a legislative function. The court
roundly rejected this, as others have done, explaining that: “This discretionary
choice of forums afforded the district attorney is simply a consequence of the exercise by the General Assembly of the power delegated to it by the Constitution.”70
Further, the court swiftly rejected an equal protection challenge to the transfer provision, noting that “treatment as a juvenile is not an inherent right.”71 Thus, the
legislature only needed to offer a rational basis for its classification of which juveniles would be charged in adult court, which it had done.72 In the absence of any
evidence of prosecutorial arbitrariness or discrimination, the court upheld the provision.73 The Bishop court is representative of many other courts during the latter
half of the twentieth century that afforded great discretion first to the legislature
that drafted transfer laws and then to the prosecutors implementing them.74
And yet there were exceptions where courts identified constitutional defects in
juvenile transfer laws. In 1972, the Tenth Circuit struck down Oklahoma’s statutory cutoff for juvenile court on equal protection grounds.75 The Oklahoma law at
issue stated that a “child” eligible for juvenile court was defined as “any male person under the age of sixteen (16) years and any female person under the age of
eighteen (18) years.”76 The Oklahoma Supreme Court had upheld the statute,
defending the distinction: “‘As we view the situation, the statute exemplifies the
legislative judgment of the Oklahoma State Legislature, premised upon the demonstrated facts of life; and we refuse to interfere with that judgment.’”77 The Tenth
Circuit found this justification insufficient: “‘Demonstrated facts of life’ could
mean many things. The ‘demonstrated facts’ which the Court relied upon are not
spelled out.”78 Without an articulation of those facts, the statute could have been
based on entirely arbitrary criteria, and it was thus unconstitutional.
More recently, the Utah Supreme Court struck down the state’s direct-file transfer provision on state constitutional grounds.79 The statute at issue in State v. Mohi
permitted the prosecutor to directly file the cases of sixteen- and seventeen-yearolds accused of capital or first-degree felonies in adult court based on pure
69. 462 S.E.2d 716.
70. Id. at 717.
71. Id. at 718.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 719.
74. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
75. Lamb v. Brown, 456 F.2d 18, 20 (10th Cir. 1972); see also Kelley v. Kaiser, 992 F.2d 1509, 1515 (10th
Cir. 1993) (finding Oklahoma transfer provisions that distinguished based on gender unconstitutional).
76. Lamb, 456 F.2d at 19.
77. Id. (quoting Lamb v. State, 475 P.2d 829, 830 (Okla. 1970)).
78. Id. at 20.
79. State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 997 (Utah 1995).
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discretion.80 The state supreme court held that the statute violated the state’s
Uniform Operation of Laws provision81—a provision akin to the Equal Protection
Clause—because it enabled prosecutors to treat similarly situated individuals differently without offering any justification for the differential treatment.82 One
sixteen-year-old charged with a first-degree felony may be charged in adult court,
while another child of the same age, facing the same charge, would be adjudicated in
juvenile court—and the law required no explanation from the state for these wildly
different outcomes.
In sum, most courts during the last half-century have upheld state transfer laws
in the face of constitutional challenges, giving lawmakers wide latitude, including
the flexibility to delegate transfer decisions to prosecutors. But there have been notable exceptions.83 And therefore courts striking down transfer laws today would
not be the first to do so.
2. The Majority Approach Is Outdated
Second, even if one recognizes that the majority of courts have upheld transfer
laws in the past, when one reads those opinions today, they appear anachronistic
and inappropriate in light of current science regarding adolescence. Recall from
Part I, supra, that this science has informed the Supreme Court’s recent juvenile
sentencing decisions, and it identifies key features of adolescence that are of constitutional significance when analyzing punishment. That science tells us that the
adolescent brain is still developing into the mid-twenties.84 It tells us that, because
of immature brain development, youth are risk-seeking, subject to peer pressure,
less capable of weighing long-term consequences against short-term rewards, and
impulsive.85 And the Supreme Court has relied upon that science to hold that youth
are categorically less culpable and more amenable to rehabilitation.86
Yet the majority of cases upholding state transfer laws were decided long before
that science was established and certainly before the Supreme Court relied upon it.
As a result, the language of these earlier cases is dissonant in the wake of Miller.
For example, in 1977, the Fifth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of Florida’s
transfer law, a provision which permitted removal from juvenile court upon a
grand jury indictment for a crime punishable by life imprisonment or death.87 The
80. See id.
81. See UTAH CONST. art. I, § 24 (“All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.”).
82. Mohi, 901 P.2d at 1004.
83. See, e.g., Hughes v. State, 653 A.2d 241, 250 (Del. 1994) (finding statute transferring child who turns
eighteen while facing charges to adult court without judicial oversight violative of state and federal
constitutions).
84. Barry C. Feld, Competence and Culpability: Delinquents in Juvenile Courts, Youths in Criminal Courts,
102 MINN. L. REV. 473, 557 (2017).
85. See generally id. at 555–61 (discussing neuroscience, developmental psychology, and their relationship to
adolescent culpability).
86. See supra Part I.
87. Woodward v. Wainwright, 556 F.2d 781, 787 (5th Cir. 1977).
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petitioners challenged this provision in the wake of Kent v. United States,88 arguing
that deprivation of juvenile court treatment should have been the subject of a hearing with procedural safeguards. The federal court rejected this claim, in part by distinguishing Kent on statutory grounds, but also by noting that “treatment as a
juvenile is not an inherent right but one granted by the state legislature. . . .”89 The
court further opined:
Doubtless the Florida legislature considered carefully the rise in the number
of crimes committed by juveniles as well as the growing recidivist rate among
this group. The legislature was entitled to conclude that the parens patriae
function of the juvenile system would not work for certain juveniles, or that
society demanded greater protection from these offenders than that provided
by that system. We should not second-guess this conclusion.90

This language is consistent with the dominant narrative about juvenile crime in
the late-twentieth century.91
These cases are jarring to read today because they refuse to recognize several juvenile justice principles that are now foundational. Children enjoy many different
kinds of rights: Youth have the right to be cared for in basic respects until the age
of majority;92 the rights of speech and expression in school;93 the right to bodily
autonomy;94 the right to express an opinion regarding custodial arrangements;95
recognized most recently, the right to be sentenced in an age-appropriate way;96
and the right to a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release” in the correctional
context.97 Given the robust development of children’s rights, it is absurd to assert
that, while juveniles have many rights, being treated as a juvenile is not one of
those rights. Moreover, the factual predicates for many of the transfer laws that
were upheld in the late-twentieth century have been belied or debunked. We know
now, for example, that the juvenile super-predator theory was plainly wrong and
88. 383 U.S. 541 (1966) (holding that juvenile was entitled to hearing, among other safeguards, before
juvenile court could waive jurisdiction).
89. Woodward, 556 F.2d at 785 (emphasis added).
90. Id.
91. See Feld, supra note 84, at 477–79 (outlining the “harsh legacy of the 1980s’ and 1990s’ get-tough
policies” regarding juvenile justice).
92. See Steven Mintz, Placing Children’s Rights in Historical Perspective, 44 CRIM. L. BULL. 313, 313
(2008) (describing “protective” children’s rights, which include a “right to a stable home, adequate subsistence,
and an education”).
93. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (upholding child’s right to
wear armband in school as right of free expression).
94. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (rejecting blanket rule requiring
parental consent for abortion because “[c]onstitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only
when one attains the state-defined age of majority”).
95. See Sarah J. Baldwin, Choosing a Home: When Should Children Make Autonomous Choices About Their
Home Life?, 46 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 503, 514–15 (2013) (surveying how states handle children’s input with
regard to custody arrangements).
96. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 480 (2012).
97. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010).
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that juvenile crime plummeted at the end of the twentieth century.98 We also
know that most youth simply “age out” of crime.99 To the extent that courts
were deferential to legislative judgment of facts on the ground, those facts no
longer govern. And finally, science has shown, and courts now accept, that it is
impossible to predict at the sentencing (let alone charging) phase whether youthful crime reflects “unfortunate yet transient immaturity” or the rare case of
“irreparable corruption.”100 As a result, courts should not casually defer to the
legislative judgment that some children, by stage of adolescence or nature of the
crime charged, are beyond the rehabilitative capacities of the juvenile system.
This conclusion simply cannot be known a priori.
In sum, while the majority of courts have upheld juvenile transfer laws in the
past, those majority opinions relied upon outdated and now irrelevant notions of
adolescents, their development, and their criminal inclinations.
3. New Challenge Rooted in the Eighth Amendment
Even if one accepts those prior cases as settled law, in the wake of Miller, there
is a new avenue for challenging transfer laws: The Eighth Amendment. The
Supreme Court has relied on the Eighth Amendment to adopt categorical bans on
sentencing practices based on the mismatch between the culpability of juvenile
offenders and the severity of certain penalties. Here, I argue that the Eighth
Amendment provides additional protection from mismatched sentences, specifically when a juvenile is exposed to the harms of adult criminal court by legislative
fiat.
Before getting to the heart of this argument, there is a preliminary issue that
must be addressed. The Eighth Amendment bars “cruel and unusual punishments.”101 Some courts have found transfer laws immune to Eighth Amendment
scrutiny because they treat these laws as “procedural” rather than “punitive” in nature.102 This argument, however, suffers from formalistic and overly simplistic reasoning. While it is true that a transfer law addresses jurisdiction and not an
ultimate sentence, it would strain any commonsense use of the term “punishment”

98. See Clyde Haberman, When Youth Violence Spurred ‘Superpredator’ Fear, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/07/us/politics/killing-on-bus-recalls-superpredator-threat-of-90s.html.
99. See Dana Goldstein, Too Old to Commit Crime?, MARSHALL PROJECT (Mar. 20, 2015), https://www.
themarshallproject.org/2015/03/20/too-old-to-commit-crime (considering neuroscience and statistical studies
that support that criminal propensity declines after a certain age).
100. Miller, 567 U.S. at 479–80 (citing and discussing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005), and
Graham, 560 U.S. at 68); see also Mary Marshall, Miller v. Alabama and the Problem of Prediction, 119 COLUM.
L. REV. 1633, 1636 (2019) (arguing that prediction is “fundamentally impossible”).
101. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
102. See, e.g., People v. Patterson, 25 N.E.3d 526, 551 (Ill. 2014) (“[I]n the absence of actual punishment
imposed by the transfer statute, defendant’s eighth amendment challenge cannot stand.”); People v. Harmon, 26
N.E.3d 344, 359 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (holding that automatic transfer statute does not impose punishment but only
specifies forum for adjudication and thus the Eighth Amendment does not apply).
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to frame transfer to adult court as non-punitive.103 As discussed in Section II.A, supra, from the outset, transfer to adult court alters the lens of analysis from rehabilitation to retribution, and it eliminates rehabilitative outcomes only available in
juvenile court. Moreover, the social science evidence indicates that minors are not
equipped to navigate the adversarial process of criminal court, and they suffer
when they attempt to do so.104 Most significant, juvenile delinquency proceedings
are civil in nature, whereas criminal court proceedings are just that: criminal in nature. The latter are adversarial and stigmatizing even in the rare case where they do
not result in punishment. Transfer laws devoid of judicial oversight are the keys
that unlock the door to adult punishment and all of its devastating consequences,
including harsh, non-rehabilitative sentences and lifelong collateral consequences.105 To label such a transfer process “procedural” rather than “punitive” is pure
sophistry,106 and courts should not shy away from reaching an Eighth Amendment
challenge to transfer laws on these grounds.
The Eighth Amendment argument against juvenile transfer laws that are devoid
of judicial discretion is fairly straightforward.107 In the Miller trilogy, the Court
articulated several findings regarding children. First, “children are constitutionally
different from adults for sentencing purposes.”108 Second, because of these significant differences, traditional punishment rationales do not have the same moral
force as applied to children. Retribution is undermined by the fact that children are
inherently less culpable; deterrence is less effective because of children’s immaturity; and incapacitation is inappropriate because “incorrigibility is inconsistent with
youth.”109 While Miller was focused on the specific sentence of JLWOP, the Court
103. Cf. Hughes v. State, 653 A.2d 241, 250 (Del. 1994) (discussing “criminal prosecution” in adult court and
its “grave attendant consequences” (emphasis added)).
104. See Feld, supra note 84, at 501–31 (examining issues with the current system of juvenile courts and
youths tried in criminal courts, given competency and psychological issues).
105. See, e.g., MARGARET LOVE & DAVID SCHLUSSEL, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR., THE MANY
ROADS TO REINTEGRATION (Sept. 2020), https://ccresourcecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/The-ManyRoads-to-Reintegration.pdf (compiling a fifty-state survey of collateral consequences to arrest and conviction).
106. See Patterson, 25 N.E.3d at 557 (Theis, J., dissenting) (“[T]hat approach is overly simplistic, and
elevates form over substance. The automatic transfer statute may indeed protect the public, but it does so by
mandatorily placing juveniles in criminal court based only on their offenses, and thereby exposing them to vastly
higher adult sentences and, in effect, punishing them.”); id. at 557–60 (reviewing legislative history that
indicated the purpose of the transfer law was to punish juveniles).
107. A few scholars have explored this issue in prior works. See, e.g., Neelum Arya, Using Graham v. Florida
to Challenge Juvenile Transfer Laws, 71 LA. L. REV. 99 (2010) (encouraging lawyers to revisit prior challenges
to transfer statutes based on Graham); Janet C. Hoeffel, The Jurisprudence of Death And Youth: Now the Twain
Should Meet, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 29, 51–55 (2013) (arguing that Miller calls into question juvenile transfer
laws); Wendy N. Hess, Kids Can Change: Reforming South Dakota’s Juvenile Transfer Law to Rehabilitate
Children and Protect Public Safety, 59 S.D. L. REV. 312 (2014) (arguing for state-specific transfer law reform in
wake of Supreme Court’s recent juvenile sentencing decisions); Scism, supra note 56 (same); Beck Roan,
Ignoring Individualism, How a Disregard for Neuroscience and Supreme Court Precedent Makes for Bad Policy
in Idaho’s Mandatory Juvenile Transfer Law, 52 IDAHO L. REV. 719 (2016) (same). I first made this argument in
The Miller Revolution. Drinan, supra note 8, at 1825–26.
108. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012).
109. Id. at 472–73 (citation omitted).
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acknowledged that “none of what [Graham] said about children—about their
distinctive (and transitory) mental traits and environmental vulnerabilities—is
crime-specific.”110 And I would urge here, that none of what the Court has said
about children is punishment-specific.
Thus, after Miller, courts may find juvenile transfer laws that are lacking judicial
discretion to be in violation of the Eighth Amendment. To begin, advocates can
argue that, just like in Graham, “a sentencing practice itself is in question,” and
thus the Supreme Court’s categorical approach from Graham is also appropriate.111
The first step of the categorical approach is to examine “objective indicia of
national consensus.”112 While it is true, as discussed in Section II.A, supra, that every state has some kind of law that permits children to be tried as adults, there are
still outlier transfer practices among the states. These outlier practices—extreme
versions of transfer in a minority of states—are ripe for Eighth Amendment scrutiny. For example, among the forty-six states where a juvenile matter begins in juvenile court, there is mandatory waiver to adult court in only twelve states.113 This
means that, in those twelve states, a statute requires the juvenile court judge to
waive jurisdiction and transfer the case to adult court once certain criteria are
met.114 Similarly, the prosecutor has the power to bring charges against a minor
directly in criminal court in only fourteen states.115 In sum, even though juvenile
transfer laws are ubiquitous in the United States, the objective indicia of community consensus are against those forms of transfer law that deprive the judiciary of
any modicum of discretion.
Consistent with the Supreme Court’s categorical approach, after considering
community consensus, courts examining extreme versions of transfer that strip
judges of discretion should also exercise their own judgment about such practices.116 As the Graham Court explained: “The judicial exercise of independent
judgment requires consideration of the culpability of the offenders at issue in light
of their crimes and characteristics, along with the severity of the punishment in
question . . . [and] whether the challenged sentencing practice serves legitimate penological goals.”117 In doing so, courts should consider not only the documented
110. Id. at 473.
111. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 61 (2010) (“This case implicates a particular type of sentence as it
applies to an entire class of offenders who have committed a range of crimes.”).
112. Id. at 62.
113. OFF. OF JUV. JUST. & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUVENILES TRIED AS ADULTS
(2018), https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/structure_process/qa04115.asp?qaDate=2018.
114. Id. (defining “mandatory waiver” as when “statutes specify when the matter must be transferred . . . after
verifying certain conditions are met”).
115. Id.; see also Jennifer S. Breen & John R. Mills, Mandating Discretion: Juvenile Sentencing Schemes
After Miller v. Alabama, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 293, 311 (2015) (identifying outlier forms of transfer provisions
under which “[t]he crime with which the child is charged is entirely and exclusively dispositive of how the child
will be sentenced and processed in the criminal justice system”).
116. Graham, 560 U.S. at 67 (“In accordance with the constitutional design, ‘the task of interpreting the
Eighth Amendment remains our responsibility.’” (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005))).
117. Id. (citations omitted).
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differences between adults and minors as reflected in the Miller trilogy,118 but also
the voluminous evidence regarding the harms of transfer laws. For example, in
2007, the Centers for Disease Control released a report on the effects of juvenile
transfer to adult court and documented significant negative outcomes. Finding that
youth tried as adults are thirty-four percent more likely to commit crimes than
youth kept in the juvenile system, the report concluded that “transferring juveniles
to the adult system is counterproductive as a strategy for preventing or reducing violence.”119 In 2012, the Department of Justice similarly released a report detailing
the harms associated with transferring children to adult court, noting that such
youth receive longer sentences and miss out on crucial adolescent developmental
opportunities.120 Most disturbing, the report discussed the ways in which youth in
adult settings are likely to be victims of sexual assault, physical assault, or both.
According to one study mentioned in the report, even though youth make up only a
small portion of prisoners in adult facilities, “21 percent of all victims of substantiated incidents of inmate-on-inmate sexual violence in jails were juveniles younger
than age 18.”121 This is consistent with other findings regarding juvenile vulnerability to physical and sexual assault in adult prisons.122 The report noted that
many researchers in the area have concluded that transfer laws do more social
harm than good.123 In sum, a court exercising its own independent judgment
regarding a narrow subset of transfer laws devoid of judicial discretion could readily determine that such laws are fundamentally unfair and irrational—that they do
not “serve legitimate penological goals” given their severity and likelihood of
inflicting harm.124
In recent years, state courts have engaged with renewed challenges to juvenile
transfer laws—challenges that leverage the logic of the Miller trilogy—and these
cases reveal an uncertain area of the law. For example, in 2014, the Illinois
Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the state’s automatic transfer
law. In People v. Patterson, the fifteen-year-old defendant was charged with aggravated sexual assault and automatically transferred to adult court, where he was
convicted and sentenced to more than thirty years in prison.125 On appeal before
the state supreme court, the defendant challenged the state’s automatic transfer

118. See supra Part I.
119. ROBERT HAN ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, EFFECTS ON VIOLENCE OF LAWS AND POLICIES
FACILITATING THE TRANSFER OF YOUTH FROM THE JUVENILE TO THE ADULT JUSTICE SYSTEM (Nov. 30, 2007),
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/rr5609a1.htm.
120. EDWARD P. MULVEY & CAROL A. SCHUBERT, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., TRANSFER OF JUVENILES TO ADULT
COURT: EFFECTS OF A BROAD POLICY IN ONE COURT 3–5 (Dec. 2012), https://ojjdp.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/
xyckuh176/files/pubs/232932.pdf.
121. Id. at 4.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 6 (“Studies like these have contributed to the conclusion that juvenile transfer policies uniformly
produce negative outcomes.”).
124. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010).
125. People v. Patterson, 25 N.E.3d 526, 530 (Ill. 2014).
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statute in light of the Miller trilogy. Based largely on the way in which the defendant framed the arguments,126 the court rejected his claims and upheld the transfer
law. Nonetheless, the court conceded the following:
We do, however, share the concern expressed in both the Supreme Court’s
recent case law and the dissent in this case over the absence of any judicial
discretion in Illinois’s automatic transfer provision. While modern research
has recognized the effect that the unique qualities and characteristics of youth
may have on juveniles’ judgment and actions, the automatic transfer provision
does not. Indeed, the mandatory nature of that statute denies this reality.127

Similarly, in 2015, the Connecticut Supreme Court considered a defendant’s
Eighth Amendment challenge to a fifteen-year mandatory sentence imposed by the
criminal court for crimes that began when he was fourteen years old.128 While the
majority rejected the defendant’s challenge by distinguishing the fifteen-year sentence from the extreme sentences at issue in the Miller trilogy,129 the concurring
and dissenting opinions demonstrated sympathy for the defendant’s claims.
Concurring in the opinion, Justice Palmer wrote extensively on the relevance of
the Miller trilogy to defendant’s case and invited the legislature “to revisit the
question of whether such mandatory prison terms are appropriate for juveniles, as
a matter of sound public policy, in light of the marked differences between juveniles and adults.”130 Moreover, the dissenting justice not only agreed with the defendant on the merits, but also specifically noted the manner in which the state’s
automatic transfer statute contributed to his unconstitutional sentence:
The mandatory transfer statute automatically transferring the defendant from
juvenile court—where the court had no sentencing floor—to adult court—
where a sentencing floor of ten years of incarceration was automatically
imposed without regard to the defendant’s individual characteristics—raised
the floor of the sentencing range and “require[d] the judge to impose a higher
punishment than he might wish.” This violates the mandates of the United

126. For example, the defendant urged the court to reconsider its due process rulings regarding the juvenile
transfer law pursuant to the Miller trilogy, and the court refused to do so noting that:
[D]efendant is attempting to support his due process argument by relying on the Supreme Court’s
eighth amendment analysis in Roper, Graham, and Miller. . . . Although both the Supreme Court
and defendant have emphasized the distinctive nature of juveniles, the applicable constitutional
standards differ considerably between due process and eighth amendment analyses.
Id. at 549.
127. Id. at 553 (internal citations omitted). See also id. at 556–69 (Theis, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
Illinois automatic transfer statute violates the Eighth Amendment per Miller and the parallel portion of the state
constitution).
128. State v. Taylor G., 110 A.3d 338, 341–42 (Conn. 2015).
129. Id. at 344–46.
130. Id. at 361 (Palmer, J., concurring).
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States Supreme Court’s juvenile sentencing jurisprudence of Roper, Graham,
and Miller.131

Most recently, litigation before the Ohio Supreme Court centered on the constitutionality of a mandatory transfer law.132 In 2016, the state supreme court struck
down the transfer statute that automatically subjected certain minors to criminal
court jurisdiction based on age and the offenses charged. Discussing both the
Miller trilogy and state constitutional provisions, the court found the transfer law
to be in violation of due process as guaranteed by the Ohio state constitution.133 As
the majority explained:
The mandatory-transfer statutes preclude a juvenile-court judge from taking
any individual circumstances into account before automatically sending a
child who is 16 or older to adult court. This one-size-fits-all approach runs
counter to the aims and goals of the juvenile system, and even those who
would be amenable to the juvenile system are sent to adult court. Juvenilecourt judges must be allowed the discretion that the General Assembly
permits for other children. They should be able to distinguish between those
children who should be treated as adults and those who should not.134

One year later, on the state’s motion for reconsideration, the Ohio Supreme
Court vacated its earlier decision and held that the mandatory transfer provision
did not, in fact, violate the federal or state constitutions.135 In a highly fragmented
decision, the court revisited the legal questions and held that the history of juvenile
law in Ohio could not support a substantive due process, a procedural due process,
or an equal protection challenge to the statute in question.136 In separate dissenting
opinions, though, two justices documented their dismay with the court’s failure to
protect minors from “mandatory transfer” that “implicates the punitive aspect of
sentencing and deprives the juvenile of access to the rehabilitative hallmarks of the
juvenile-justice system.”137 The chief justice wrote in dissent that, under fundamental fairness and procedural due process analysis, juveniles should be entitled to
an amenability hearing before removal from the juvenile court system.138 Echoing
the sentiments of the chief justice, the second dissenting justice wrote even more
explicitly that the reconsidered decision was merely a function of politics:

131. Id. at 378 (Eveleigh, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted).
132. State v. Aalim, 83 N.E.3d 862, 864 (Ohio 2016), vacated by State v. Aalim, 83 N.E.3d 883 (Ohio 2017).
133. Id. at 868–70.
134. Id. at 870.
135. State v. Aalim, 83 N.E.3d 883, 887 (Ohio 2017).
136. Id. at 890–96. The court also noted that it had failed in its original review of the case “to consider the General
Assembly’s exclusive constitutional authority to define the jurisdiction of the courts of common pleas . . . .” Id. at
896.
137. Id. at 903 (O’Connor, C.J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 905–13.
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“[T]here is nothing new to reconsider here; the only thing that has changed is the
makeup of this court as a result of the 2016 election.”139
While none of these cases were a clear victory for juvenile justice advocates
challenging mandatory transfer laws under Miller, they nonetheless provide
grounds for optimism. These opinions reveal that this area of the law is anything
but settled. Moreover, the discord among judges in these decisions drives home the
fact that “[i]n the context of juvenile transfer to adult court, the Supreme Court has
remained silent since Kent,” and in doing so has created “confusion as to what
authority state legislatures have to enact mandatory-transfer statutes with limited
or no process.”140 Given the body of Eighth Amendment law that the U.S.
Supreme Court has developed in the last fifteen years insisting that youth must be
considered at sentencing, these recent cases only highlight the fact that juvenile
transfer laws are ripe for constitutional challenge today.
B. Mandatory Minimums as Applied to Youth
Juvenile transfer laws and mandatory minimums together create the perfect
storm for justice-involved youth. Automatic transfer laws place children in adult
court without judicial oversight, and once children are charged in adult court, they
are subject to mandatory minimums that were drafted with adults in mind. Just as
the Miller trilogy renders automatic transfer laws unlawful, so too does it undermine the legitimacy of mandatory minimums as applied to youth. I have made this
claim before,141 and here I will only recap it briefly before discussing recent litigation in this area. Simply put, one cannot square mandatory sentencing of juveniles
with either the language or the logic of the Miller trilogy. In Miller, the Court
explained that “[m]andatory life without parole for a juvenile precludes consideration of his chronological age and its hallmark features—among them, immaturity,
impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences.”142 And while skeptics of my claim note that the Court was specifically addressing JLWOP sentences,
in an earlier part of the decision, the Miller Court acknowledged that “none of
what [Graham] said about children—about their distinctive (and transitory) mental
traits and environmental vulnerabilities—is crime-specific.”143 And in the same
way, none of what the Court has said about children’s diminished culpability is
sentence-specific either. Children are still immature, impetuous, risk-seeking, and
subject to peer pressure whether they are facing a death-in-custody sentence or a
mandatory sentence of fifteen years. Moreover, the Miller Court drew on two
strands of precedent to arrive at its decision: its line of cases dealing with categorical bans on certain sentences and its line of cases barring mandatory imposition of
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 914 (O’Neill, J., dissenting).
Id.
Drinan, The Miller Revolution, supra note 8, at 1819–24.
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 477 (2012).
Id. at 473.
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the death penalty.144 Together, these two lines of cases led the Court to conclude
that children are categorically different from adults for sentencing purposes
and that those differences should be examined in an individualized, granular manner. Thus, in the wake of Miller, mandatory minimum sentencing schemes—
schemes that preclude consideration of youth and its mitigating attributes—cannot
apply to minors.
To date, only one state supreme court has taken this position. In State v. Lyle,
the Iowa Supreme Court declared mandatory minimums as applied to youth unconstitutional under its state constitution.145 In an expansive opinion, the Lyle court
canvassed the history of juvenile justice in America, as well as the Supreme
Court’s recent bans on extreme juvenile sentencing in the Miller trilogy.146 The
Lyle court concluded:
Miller is properly read to support a new sentencing framework that reconsiders mandatory sentencing for all children. Mandatory minimum sentencing
results in cruel and unusual punishment due to the differences between children and adults. This rationale applies to all crimes, and no principled basis
exists to cabin the protection only for the most serious crimes.147

The Lyle court correctly focused on the fact that the lynchpin of the Miller trilogy
was the defining characteristics of children that render them less culpable. Those
defining characteristics do not vary with the charges or the penalty that children
face, and to the extent that those characteristics demand individual assessment,
that must be true in all sentencing contexts.
Courts that have upheld mandatory minimums in the face of a Miller-based challenge have relied on a mistakenly narrow reading of the Miller trilogy, finding
Miller only applicable to JLWOP cases. For example, an Arizona appellate court
determined, “Miller stated only that ‘a judge or jury must have the opportunity to
consider mitigating circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty
for juveniles.’”148 The court elaborated that this defendant “did not receive the
harshest penalty. Instead, the trial court imposed a sentence of life without the possibility of release for twenty-five years.”149 That court held that “the requirement
for ‘individualized sentencing’ was based on the [Miller] Court’s determination
that natural-life prison terms for juveniles are analogous to capital punishment for
adults,”150 and thus Miller did not preclude other mandatory minimum sentences
for minors. While it is true that the Miller Court viewed JLWOP as analogous to a
144. Id. at 470.
145. State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 380 (Iowa 2014).
146. Id. at 390–95.
147. Id. at 402.
148. State v. Imel, No. 2 CA-CR 2015-0112, 2015 WL 7373800, at *3 (Ariz. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2015)
(citation omitted).
149. Id.
150. Id.; see also People v. Wilson, 62 N.E.3d 329, 337, 340 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016) (limiting Miller’s application
to cases of mandatory JLWOP).
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death sentence for an adult, the Court’s decision relied upon two separate lines of
precedent, not solely the precedent that bars mandatory imposition of the death
penalty. As discussed above, the Court drew first upon its line of cases that have
categorically rejected certain kinds of sentences for certain classes of individuals.151 And in further developing that line of cases, the Court cemented its “kidsare-different” jurisprudence and rejected an entire category of sentence for youth
based on their diminished culpability and capacity for rehabilitation.152 Lower
courts are not free to ignore that co-equal part of the Court’s rationale so as to confine the Miller decision to the JLWOP arena.
Other courts that reject Miller-based challenges to mandatory minimums fail to
recognize the interplay of transfer laws and mandatory minimum laws, as
described supra in Part II. For example, in State v. Taylor G., the Supreme Court
of Connecticut rejected the defendant’s challenge to his mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years for a sexual assault conviction.153 At sentencing, the trial
court itself expressed hesitation about the mandatory minimum sentence given the
young age of the defendant and the fact that he had experienced childhood abuse.
Further, the trial court noted that lawmakers were not contemplating fourteenyear-old defendants when they enacted the mandatory minimums. Nonetheless,
bound by governing law, the trial court gave the defendant what it described as the
most “lenient [sentence it] possibly c[ould].”154
On appeal, the defendant challenged his mandatory minimum sentence as disproportionate and unlawful post-Miller. As most courts do, the high court in
Connecticut myopically viewed the Miller line of cases as only applicable to the
“two most severe punishments courts are able to impose.”155 As discussed above,
the Miller trilogy was equally focused on severity of sentences and the distinguishing and mitigating qualities of youth. More disturbing, though, is the fact that the
Connecticut Supreme Court defended the mandatory minimums as applied to a
fourteen-year-old based on the rationale that the sentencing court did have some
discretion: it could have imposed the maximum applicable sentence of fifty-five
years, but, instead, it applied the statutory minimum.156 Further, the court noted,
“[a] mandatory minimum sentence is, by definition, the least punitive sentence that
may be imposed under a sentencing statute.”157 The court concluded that, given the

151. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 470 (2012).
152. See id. (holding mandatory JLWOP unconstitutional); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010)
(holding JLWOP for non-homicidal offenses unconstitutional).
153. 110 A.3d 338, 341–42 (Conn. 2015). The defendant was convicted of sexually assaulting his cousin
beginning when he was fourteen years old and continuing until he was fifteen years old. The conviction carried a
mandatory minimum of ten years for the sexual assault conviction and five years for a related risk of injury to a
child conviction. Id. at 341–42.
154. Id. at 343–44.
155. Id. at 346.
156. Id. at 347.
157. Id.
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nature of the conviction, the mandatory minimum was not disproportionate for
Eighth Amendment purposes.
But the court ignored what the trial court had noted—that the mandatory minimums were not drafted with fourteen-year-olds in mind. And in Taylor G.’s case,
the mandatory minimum was only applicable to him because of the state’s automatic transfer provision. Under the state’s statutory exclusion law, any minor
charged with committing a Class A or B felony after the age of fourteen was automatically removed from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction to the regular criminal
docket.158 Once in adult court, it is true that the “least punitive sentence” for
Taylor G. was fifteen years. However, in juvenile court, Taylor G. would have benefited from the fact that “the dispositional goal of the Juvenile Court is treatment
more than punishment”;159 he may have received rehabilitation services; he would
have avoided time in an adult correctional facility; and he would have faced a maximum four-year term with a possible extension based on needs.160 In short, the
Connecticut Supreme Court ignored the perfect storm that subjected Taylor G. to a
fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence in adult prison beginning at the age of
fourteen.161 Instead of confronting the combination of mandatory transfer provisions and mandatory minimum sentencing that led to this child’s fifteen-year term
in an adult facility, the court defended the sentence as being less bad than the worst
case scenario of fifty-five years. Courts can and should do better by children.162
Finally, too many courts have rejected the idea that mandatory minimums for
children are unlawful after Miller simply on the grounds that the argument is novel.
By the Iowa Supreme Court’s own admission: “[N]o other court in the nation has
held that its constitution or the Federal Constitution prohibits a statutory schema
that prescribes a mandatory minimum sentence for a juvenile offender.”163 And
further, the Lyle court recognized that “most states permit or require some or all juvenile offenders to be given mandatory minimum sentences.”164 It is true that one
state court’s decision is not binding on other states, but it is equally true that
another state court’s decision can be persuasive authority. In light of what we
know about children’s diminished culpability and capacity for growth, and given
the one-two punch of automatic transfer and mandatory sentencing, courts should
be more solicitous of defendants’ challenges to mandatory minimums after Miller.
Courts should not put a thumb on the scale of the status quo from the late-twentieth
century and blindly adhere to a misguided—albeit majority—approach.165

158. Id. at 342 n.5.
159. CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY, OLR RESEARCH REPORT: JUVENILES & THE COURTS, https://www.cga.ct.gov/
PS94/rpt/olr/htm/94-R-1040.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2021).
160. Id.
161. Id. (outlining requirements for juveniles tried as adults); see Taylor G., 110 A.3d at 342.
162. Taylor G., 110 A.3d at 362–87 (Eveleigh, J., dissenting).
163. State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 386 (Iowa 2014).
164. Id.
165. See id. at 387 (“‘[C]onsensus is not dispositive.’” (citation omitted)).
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CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have argued that there is a clear path for courts to find both automatic transfer laws and mandatory minimums as applied to youth unlawful after
Miller. These are indeed minority views, and by way of conclusion, I will address
two criticisms.
First, as I discussed supra in Part III, some judges continue to view the Miller
trilogy through a narrow lens—they insist that it was a line of cases only about
JLWOP, and even then, only JLWOP imposed as a result of one conviction for one
crime, and perhaps even then, only in a context devoid of parole or clemency. Two
rejoinders are especially relevant here. First, many courts have already expanded
the Miller rationale to instances where the defendant received a de facto life sentence and to instances where an extreme sentence is the result of aggregated termof-year sentences.166 And this is because those courts have accepted the science of
adolescent development as embraced by the Supreme Court.167 History will frown
upon those jurists who ignore that science and insist on mechanically applying the
narrowest version of the Miller rulings.
Second, some criticize the capacious reading of Miller that I have articulated
herein by making an outlier argument. That is, those who resist the science of adolescent development and the fact of diminished juvenile culpability unfailingly
point out that some kids commit very serious crimes. Those critics say, “What
about teens who participate in a heinous homicide? How about the so-called D.C.
Sniper? Surely those kids deserve the most serious sentences!”168 Or, “what about
the Twitter hacker?” they ask. “He didn’t seem very immature.”169 This argument
is of no moment. Of course, it is true that some adolescents commit very serious,
life-altering crimes and that their victims suffer tremendously. But this reality is
also irrelevant because I am not proposing any sentencing schemes that would preclude serious, potentially life-long, punishment for some adolescents. I argue that
we should return to a default where juveniles are dealt with in juvenile court, and
where only an informed judge can make the grave decision to transfer a child to
adult court. Further, I simply argue that, if a judge makes that grave decision to
transfer a child to adult court, and, if a child is convicted in adult court, then they
should still enjoy the benefits of individualized consideration demanded by the
166. See Drinan, supra note 3, at 59.
167. See, e.g., State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41 (Iowa 2013) (finding that juvenile’s 52.5-year minimum prison
term for aggregated mandatory minimum sentences triggered protections of Miller and collecting cases on the
issue).
168. Ariane de Vogue, Supreme Court Dismisses DC Sniper’s Case, CNN: POL. (Feb. 26, 2020), https://www.
cnn.com/2020/02/26/politics/supreme-court-lee-boyd-malvo-case-dc-sniper/index.html (describing case of
seventeen-year-old Lee Boyd Malvo, who was originally sentenced to JLWOP).
169. Kate Conger & Nathaniel Popper, Florida Teenager Is Charged as ‘Mastermind’ of Twitter Hack, N.Y.
TIMES (July 31, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/31/technology/twitter-hack-arrest.html (describing
case of seventeen-year-old Graham Ivan Clark, who hacked famous Twitter accounts and is being charged as an
adult).
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Miller trilogy. Neither of those proposals precludes an extreme sentence for an outlier case in which a juvenile defendant is convicted in adult court of a most serious
crime. It is true that my proposals would require more resources, care, and consideration by judges and prosecutors, but it is not true that my proposals ignore the
instances when youth commit serious crime and require proportionally serious
sentences.
Despite the moral import and the practical significance of the Miller trilogy,
youth in America continue to be subject to extreme sentences. This often occurs
not because a judge determines that the minor’s case exceeds the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court or even because an adult criminal court judge determines that the
minor deserves a lengthy term-of-year sentence. Rather, extreme youth sentences
persist after Miller often because of the interplay between unbridled transfer provisions and mandatory sentencing schemes. As I have argued in this Article, today,
relying upon the language, science, and logic of the Miller trilogy, courts should
review challenges to these two procedural elements, and their interplay, with fresh
eyes.

